Forthcoming in Nietzsche's Engagements with Kant, Volume I: Ethics, edited by Tom Bailey and João Constâncio.
KANT ON THE PROBLEM OF NORMATIVE AUTHORITY
Normative claims invite the question of why they should hold sway over us. Kant proposed to answer this question by tying the authority of norms to our own activity: norms hold sway over us because we impose them on ourselves.
Thus, Kant claims that the will must view itself "as the author of its principles independently of alien influences" (G 4:448) . If we consider a normative principle-or, as Kant puts it, a "law"-that constrains the will, then the will must give itself this law:
Hence the will is not merely subject to the law, but subject to it in such a way that it must be regarded as also giving law to itself and just because of this as first subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author). (G 4:431) Anything less would render the will heteronomous, or unfree: fancy; rather, although we impose norms on ourselves, these norms constrain us in a way that is not up to us-for which norms we impose on ourselves is not fully up to us.
HEGEL ON THE PROBLEM OF NORMATIVE AUTHORITY
This discussion of Kant and Hegel brings to light a criterion of adequacy on a successful account of normative authority: if we are to explain normative authority in terms of self-imposed commitments, then there must be determinate constraints on the content of these commitments. In Section 2.1, I explain why Hegel thinks that Kant's theory is incapable of meeting this criterion of adequacy. Section 2.2 sketches Hegel's alternative solution to the problem of normative authority. I argue that the core difference between Kant and Hegel on normative authority is this: whereas Kant thinks we derive norms from the idea of freedom, Hegel thinks we use freedom not to derive norms, but to assess norms.
HEGEL'S OBJECTION TO KANT
Consider an old and familiar criticism: Kant's formal description of autonomy, as willing in accordance with the Categorical Imperative, does not yield any substantive results. Hegel was the first to levy this objection: he famously claims that Kant's view operates with an exceedingly "formal" or "abstract" conception of autonomy, which renders the theory an "empty formalism" (PR 135) . There is controversy regarding the exact way in which Hegel's formalism objection should be interpreted, but on the most common interpretation, Hegel is claiming that Kant's universalization procedure does not yield any determinate conclusions. 3 3 Wood (1990) presents a helpful survey of several other possible readings. See also "Hegel's Ethical Rationalism," in Pippin (1997) .
To see what Hegel has in mind, consider one of Kant's applications of the Categorical Imperative in the Critique of Practical Reason. Kant asks us to consider a case in which I have been given some money to hold as a deposit, the individual making the deposit has died, and no record of the deposit exists. I ask myself whether I can keep this money for myself rather than reporting it to the deceased's heirs. Kant claims that we can apply the Categorical Imperative by asking whether the following principle could be willed as a universal law: "that everyone may deny a deposit of which no one can produce a proof." He claims that it cannot, for "I at once become aware that such a principle, viewed as a law, would annihilate itself, because the result would be that there would be no deposits" (C2 5:27-28) . In other words, this maxim fails the universalization test, because if it were universalized then the institution of making deposits would disappear, and it would therefore no longer be possible to act on the maxim.
Hegel objects, arguing that
The absence of property contains in itself just as little contradiction as the non-existence of this or that nation, family, etc., or the death of the whole human race. But if it is already established on other grounds and presupposed that property and human life are to exist and be respected, then indeed it is a contradiction to commit theft or murder; a contradiction must be a contradiction of something, i.e. of some content presupposed from the start as a fixed principle. (PR 135R) Hegel agrees with Kant that if the maxim of stealing deposits (or, more generally, property) in order to enrich oneself were universalized, the institution of deposit-making would disappear. However, Hegel claims that unless we presuppose, as a fixed principle, that deposits (or, more generally, property) should exist, this generates no contradiction at all.
The general point is well put in the Phenomenology:
It would be strange, too, if tautology, the principle of contradiction, which is admitted to be only a formal principle for the cognition of theoretical truth, i.e., something which is quite indifferent to truth and falsehood, were supposed to be more than this for the cognition of practical truth. (PhG 431) In other words, no one thinks that a contradiction test can tell us which theoretical beliefs are true.
The beliefs "it is raining here" and "it is not raining here" are contradictory, so we know that they cannot both be true; but we cannot conclude, from the mere fact that they are contradictory, which one is true. Hegel's central point is that it is odd to think that things would be different in the practical realm. As the property case illustrates, certain maxims will generate contradictions with the institution of property; but this does not tell us whether the maxim is immoral or the institution of property is immoral. To make that judgment-to move from the idea that two propositions are contradictory to the idea that one of them is correct-we need to appeal to some independent grounds for determining what is moral. This is why Hegel criticizes the idea of self-imposed constraints: he understands Kant as offering a merely formal criterion, which fails to generate any substantive constraints on what can be willed. 4 If this objection is correct, then Kant's attempted derivation of substantive norms from the formal conception of autonomy runs afoul of the criterion of adequacy discussed above: the demand for autonomy does not yield any determinate constraints, and therefore collapses the distinction between norms and whims.
HEGEL'S ALTERNATIVE TO THE KANTIAN STRATEGY
These criticisms notwithstanding, Hegel does not think that Kantian morality should be completely abandoned. Rather, he characteristically argues that the failures of Kantian morality point us toward a more encompassing understanding of normativity-an understanding that resolves the problems to which Kantian morality succumbs.
Although Hegel agrees with Kant that normative considerations are authoritative only if they can be viewed as products of freedom, Hegel interprets this requirement in a different way than does Kant. 5 To bring out the differences between Kant and Hegel, let's focus on two questions:
(1) What is the object of assessment?
(2) How is the assessment conducted?
Kant's answers to the two questions are clear: the agent assesses her maxims, and the assessment consists in determining whether the maxim passes the Categorical Imperative test. For Hegel, however, the answers are considerably more complex. First, the individual does not assess maxims, but social institutions and practices. Second, the individual does not attempt to show that these institutions and practices are consistent with or derivable from some additional, external standard.
Rather, she attempts to show that they are institutions or practices that make freedom possible. Let me explain.
With regard to the first point, Hegel famously argues that the agent's freedom can be achieved only within and through certain social institutions and practices: simply put, I realize my freedom by conforming to the ethical practices of my society. As Hegel puts it, "only that will 5 Hegel claims that the Philosophy of Right's central task is to show how "the system of right is the realm of actualized freedom" (PR 4). He emphasizes this point throughout the book, writing that "ethicality is the idea of freedom as the living good that has its knowing, willing, and, through its acting, its actuality, in self-consciousness…." (PR 142), and "the ethical is the system of these determinations of the idea; this is what constitutes its rationality. In this way it is freedom…" (PR 145).
which obeys the law is free" (VG 115/97). However, not just any set of institutions and practices will enable individuals to realize their freedom. Consider a simple example: if the laws and institutions of my society condemn me to a life of slavery, I will not be able fully to realize my freedom by conforming to those laws and institutions. Thus, Hegel claims that we can ask, of any set of social institutions or practices, whether they enable all individuals to realize their freedom.
The institutions count as "rational," in Hegel's terminology, or "justified," in ours, if they meet this condition, making it possible for all individuals to realize themselves as self-determined entities. Moreover, the institutions and practices must be such that subjects are not only in fact free, but are also capable of recognizing their own freedom. That is, individuals must be able to view these institutions and practices as expressions of their own wills, so that participation in them is conceived as free activity. 7 In The Philosophy of Right, Hegel argues that three modern social institutions-the family, civil society, and the liberal state-jointly fulfill these conditions (PR 157ff.).
6 Hegel writes, "Within the state, rationality consists concretely-in terms of its content-in the unity of objective freedom (i.e., of universal substantial willing) and subjective freedom (i.e., of the individual human's knowing and willing, which seeks its particular ends)" (PR 258). In several passages, he emphasizes that society must enable the freedom of all individuals. For example, he writes that society requires the "well-being of all" (PR 125, emphasis added), and he argues that it is necessary that "every individual's livelihood and well-being be treated and actualized as rightful" (PR 230). 7 Thus, after writing, "only that will which obeys the law is free," Hegel continues, "for it obeys itself and is self-sufficient and therefore free" (VG 115/97). Elsewhere, he puts the point as follows: "the laws and powers of ethical substance are not something alien to the subject. Instead, the subject bears witness to them as to its own essence, within which it has its feelings of being a self, within which it lives as in its own element, an element it does not distinguish from itself" (PR 147; cf. PR 258). 8 The full argument for these claims occupies PR 157-360. See especially PR 157-8, 181-8, and 257-9. Helpful secondary literature on these points includes Houlgate (1991) , Neuhouser (2000) , Pinkard (2002) , Pippin (2008) , and Wood (1990 Accordingly, Hegel's theory has a non-foundationalist structure.
So Hegel's method of justifying normative authority involves scrutinizing the social institutions and practices that we find ourselves with, and showing that they are, or at least aspire to be, realizations of freedom: we can affirm them as institutions and practices in which we realize our own freedom. Asking whether the normative claims embodied in these institutions and practices are justified does not involve showing that they can be derived from some formal criterion, such as the Categorical Imperative. These norms need not be derived from anything at all. Rather, justifying the norms requires showing that, although they are historically contingent, they actualize our freedom.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NIETZSCHEAN, KANTIAN, AND HEGELIAN THEORIES OF NORMATIVE AUTHORITY
To summarize: Kant and Hegel agree that unless there are some constraints on what can be autonomously willed, the attempt to explain normative authority in terms of autonomy is hopeless.
However, the prior sections have shown that beyond this point of agreement, the Kantian and Hegelian theories of normative authority diverge in two important ways. First, Kant and Hegel disagree on the objects of assessment: whereas Kant argues that we assess maxims of particular actions, Hegel tells us to assess the norms embodied in social institutions and practices. Second, Kant and Hegel disagree on the manner in which norms are to be assessed: Kant claims that we can derive specific moral requirements from the bare idea of freedom, whereas Hegel argues that while a derivation of specific requirements from freedom is impossible, we can use the idea of freedom to assess extant normative structures.
With these results at hand, we can examine the relationship between the Nietzschean, Kantian, and Hegelian theories of normative authority. In this section, I show that Nietzsche's theory incorporates the most appealing features of the Kantian and Hegelian accounts, and also rejects certain problematic aspects of these accounts. 10 Unfortunately, Nietzsche's resultant theory seems incoherent-in trying to be both Kantian and Hegelian, it runs the risk of collapsing into unintelligibility. However, Section 4 argues that what looks like a problem is actually Nietzsche's deepest insight: we can, in fact, reconcile the most promising aspects of the Kantian and Hegelian theories, and thereby produce a satisfying account of normative authority.
NIETZSCHE'S AGREEMENT THAT FREEDOM PLACES DETERMINATE CONSTRAINTS ON WHAT CAN BE WILLED
One of the most prominent themes in Nietzsche's work is the idea that we must critically assess our values. He famously calls for a "revaluation of all values," writing, "we need a critique of moral values, for once the value of these values must itself be called into question" (GM Preface 6). To revalue a value is to ask whether it merits the status that we accord to it. For example, to revalue egalitarianism would be to engage in a critical assessment of the value that we place on 10 As note 2 indicated, I do not aim to show Nietzsche himself envisioned his project in this way.
egalitarianism. We might begin by asking whether egalitarianism is really valuable, or whether our valuation of egalitarianism is justified, or whether everyone has reason to value egalitarianism.
Interestingly, Nietzsche associates revaluation with the achievement of freedom. Nietzsche's account of freedom has received increased attention in the last decade. Brian Leiter (2002) and other authors have argued convincingly that Nietzsche rejects certain conceptions of freedom, such as the libertarian conception. However, a number of interpreters have shown that Nietzsche has another conception of freedom, as self-determination or autonomy. 11 Thus, while Nietzsche inveighs against the idea of freedom as an uncaused cause (BGE 21), he praises those who possess the "power of selfdetermination" (GS 347), and he regularly speaks of "evaluating on one's own," being "sovereign,"
and being "autonomous" (HH Preface 3, GM II.12). He writes that the free individual "is obliged to have recourse to his own law-giving" (BGE 262), and that free individuals enjoy a "constraint and perfection under a law [Gesetz] of their own" (GS 290). In a strikingly Kantian moment, he even claims that free individuals are those who "give themselves laws [Sich-selber-Gesetzgebenden]" (GS 335;
cf. D 104, GS 117, A 54).
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As these passages indicate, Nietzsche links freedom to revaluation. In fact, Nietzsche often treats as interchangeable the "will to self-determination, to evaluating on one's own account, this will to free will" (HH P.3). He argues that if an agent remains under the sway of values that have not been subjected to this process of critical revaluation, then the agent is unfree:
The fettered spirit takes up his position, not for reasons, but out of habit; he is a Christian, for example, not because he has knowledge of the various religions and has chosen between them… he encountered Christianity… and adopted it without reasons, as a man born in a wine-producing country becomes a wine drinker. (HH I.226)
So it is clear that Nietzsche has a conception of freedom as self-determination, according to which an agent counts as self-determining or autonomous if she acts on values that have been subjected to the process of "revaluation."
But how exactly does Nietzsche conceive of the relationship between freedom and revaluation? Kant thought we could derive specific normative claims from the idea of freedom;
Hegel argued that while we cannot do that, we can use freedom to assess extant normative claims. If
Nietzsche adopted a view of this form, the link between freedom and revaluation would be clear: Nietzsche alleges that the CI simply enables post hoc rationalizations of existing moral beliefs (Hegel's discussion of property is a perfect example: both the necessity and the abolition of property can be justified in terms of the CI). Moreover, Nietzsche criticizes the structure of the Kantian theory, denying that any moral theory could have the kind of foundationalist structure that Kant envisions. In this light, he writes that Kant and other moral philosophers "make one laugh" with their quest for "a rational foundation for morality." He claims that "seen clearly in the light of day," their theories amount to nothing more than a "scholarly form of good faith in the dominant morality, a new way of expressing it" (BGE 186).
Rather than attempting to derive morality from some foundational principle, Nietzsche with a straight-laced seriousness that provokes laughter, demanded something much higher, more pretentious, more solemn of themselves as soon as they have concerned themselves with morality as a science: they wanted to furnish the rational ground of morality… How far from their clumsy pride was that apparently insignificant task left in dust and mildew, the task of description, although the most delicate hands and senses could hardly be delicate enough for it! (BGE 186)
Mocking the (Kantian) project of furnishing a "rational ground" for morality-a foundational principle from which we can derive a correct moral system-Nietzsche claims that the real task for philosophy is the collection of information about the system of value-feelings and value-distinctions that are present in society. I take it that part of what Nietzsche means to highlight, by using the unusual terms "value-feeling" and "value-distinction" [Werthgefühle und Werthunterschiede] rather than "value," is that our values are not simply manifest in our reflective, conscious judgments, but are ensconced in less reflective forms of relating to the world: in our intuitive reactions, distinctions, ways of classifying or distinguishing actions, and indeed in our feelings. Hegel tells us that it is a mistake to think that we can derive a correct set of ethical norms from some formal principle, such as the Categorical Imperative. Rather, we must always begin with a historically situated set of norms. But rather than just accepting these norms as given, we must assess them to see whether they are conducive to the realization of freedom. They can fail by this criterion, and if they do, they must be modified or rejected.
Nietzsche agrees with Hegel's claim that we do not justify norms by deriving them from some formal principle. This is why he mocks the attempt to provide a "rational ground" for morality (BGE 186). Moreover, Nietzsche's critiques of our current values and practices often look quite similar to the Hegelian process of assessing extant norms and values to see whether they live up to their aspirations. To choose a simple example, Nietzsche repeatedly argues that our practice of compassion fails to live up to its own aims: while compassion aims to aid the object of the compassion, Nietzsche contends that attention to the psychology of compassion will reveal that it harms both the compassionate person and the object of her compassion. 14 If this were correct, then we would have reason to reconsider the value placed on compassion. Many of Nietzsche's critiques can profitably be read in this fashion, for they often proceed by bringing to light hidden contradictions and inconsistencies in our practices and our dominant values. In other words, many of Nietzsche's critiques consist in showing, as he puts it, that "the motives of this morality stand opposed to its principle" (GS 21).
Nietzsche therefore seems to be in agreement with Hegel's two departures from Kant:
namely, Hegel's claim that we assess norms embodied in social institutions and practices, and
Hegel's anti-foundationalist method of critiquing norms. However, a closer examination reveals that Nietzsche and Hegel part company on this last point. There are two important differences:
Nietzsche and Hegel disagree on how far-reaching the critique of modern norms will be, and they also disagree on whether the critique appeals to some principle that is external to the currently dominant set of norms.
14 For a helpful discussion of this point, see Reginster (2006, 186ff.) .
Start with the first point. For Hegel, the critique is restricted to determining whether our social institutions and laws live up to their aspirations: while they aspire to be realizations of human freedom, they can fall short of that ideal, and therefore require modification. Nietzsche, however, pursues a far more radical critique: he wants to show that the very ideals to which these institutions aspire must be reassessed. As he puts it in the Genealogy,
What if a symptom of regression were inherent in the 'good', likewise a danger, a seduction, a poison, a narcotic, through which the present was possibly living at the expense of the future? [...] So that precisely morality would be to blame if the highest power and splendor actually possible to the type man were never in fact attained? So that precisely morality were the danger of dangers? (GM Preface 6)
In his own work, Nietzsche critiques some of our most cherished values. To choose just a few examples: he complains that the effects of "liberal institutions" are "known well enough: they undermine the will to power" (TI ix.38). He writes, "well-being as you understand it-that is no goal, that seems to us an end, a state that soon makes man ridiculous and contemptible" (BGE 225).
What "has been called morality," Nietzsche insists, will "deprive existence of its great character" (EH iv.4). And he warns that "our weak, unmanly social concepts of good and evil and their tremendous ascendancy over body and soul have finally weakened all bodies and souls and snapped the selfreliant, independent, unprejudiced men, the pillars of a strong civilization" (D 163; cf. BGE 62, A 5). show that the current set of social institutions is more or less correct, and strives toward an appropriate ideal, Nietzsche wants to levy a much more radical critique: he aims to show that the basic values informing these social institutions, the basic values that these institutions strive to realize, must be reassessed.
And yet, like both Kant and Hegel, Nietzsche wants the authority of norms to be grounded in the fact that they are, in some sense, self-imposed. So Nietzsche's view seems to hover uneasily between Kant's and Hegel's, in that he endorses all of the following claims:
1. The demand for autonomy produces determinate constraints on what is to be valued. 15 Thus, in BGE 211, Nietzsche claims that Kant and Hegel merely adopt the dominant values of their times, and "identify them and reduce them to formulas." He contrasts this with the work of "real philosophers." Nietzsche argues that real philosophers must do more than simply accept and codify the dominant value; they must "apply the knife of vivisection to the virtues of their time" (BGE 212), and create new values.
he argues that the "principle of revaluation" or the "standard by which the value of moral evaluation is to be determined" is "will to power" (WP 391/KSA 12:2[131]). 17 In other words, revaluation is to be conducted in terms of will to power. Second, Nietzsche claims that we achieve freedom to the extent that we manifest will to power. For example, he identifies the "instinct for freedom" with the 16 To recap: Kant and Hegel both endorse versions of (1). Kant denies (2), whereas Hegel accepts (2). Kant and Hegel both accept (3), but interpret the requirement in different ways. Kant and Hegel both deny (4). 17 He makes the same point elsewhere, writing, "what is good? Everything that heightens in human beings the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself" (A 2). Here, he again suggests that the criterion of assessment for other values is will to power.
"will to power" (GM II.18), he claims that a free will is equivalent to a "strong" will, i.e., a will that manifests will to power (BGE 21), 18 and, in a section entitled "my conception of freedom," he claims that freedom is measured according to the degree of power expressed by an individual. 19 Taking these claims into account, I submit that the basic structure of Nietzsche's theory is as follows: an agent is autonomous if she acts on values that have been "revaluated" or critically assessed; this critical assessment is conducted in terms of will to power; so, an agent is autonomous if she acts on values that are consistent with-but not derived from-will to power. This is what
Nietzsche intends when he claims that freedom should be understood in terms of will to power.
The question, of course, is what all of this means. What is will to power? Why must revaluation be conducted in terms of will to power? The following sections address these questions.
This will enable us to see how Nietzsche's theory manages to combine the most appealing features of the Kantian and Hegelian accounts of normative authority, while avoiding some of their potential problems.
WHAT IS WILL TO POWER?
To begin, we need to understand what Nietzsche means by will to power. It is important not to be misled by the surface connotations of the term "power" [Macht] . In ordinary discourse, the claim that people will power would suggest that they strive to dominate, tyrannize, and subjugate others. But this is not what Nietzsche has in mind. Power is a term of art, for Nietzsche; he gives it a special sense.
Nietzsche characterizes will to power in language that seems deliberately vague; he associates power with a family of terms, such as "giving form," "expanding," "imprinting," "overcoming,"
"mastering," and "shaping." 20 He writes that will to power is "the will's forward thrust and again and again becoming master over that which stands in its way" (WP 696/KSA 13:11[75] ). Moreover, Nietzsche does not attribute a specific end to those who will power; he claims that the will to power is manifest in activities that are directed at disparate ends. For example, Nietzsche tells us that human beings will power by engaging in activities as diverse as pursuing knowledge, creating art, participating in athletic endeavors, and writing novels (cf. GM II.17-18 et passim).
In order to see exactly what will to power is, we will need to determine what these characterizations of will to power have in common. Although Nietzsche's descriptions tend to be rather elliptical, he does repeatedly and insistently emphasize two points about will to power.
First, Nietzsche claims that will to power can never enjoy permanent satisfaction, but instead involves perpetual striving.
The wish to preserve oneself is the symptom of a condition of distress, of a limitation of the really fundamental instinct of life which aims at the expansion of power, and wishing for that frequently risks and even sacrifices self-preservation. (GS 349)
A condition once achieved would seem to be obliged to preserve itself-Spinoza's law of "self-preservation" ought really to put a stop to change: but this law is false, the opposite is true. It can be shown most clearly that every living thing does everything it can not to preserve itself but to become more-(WP 688/KSA 13:14[121])
In contrasting the desire to "preserve oneself"-that is, the desire to abide in one's current statewith the will to power, Nietzsche emphasizes that will to power involves perpetual striving.
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Second, will to power manifests itself as a particular form of striving: striving for resistances or obstacles. Consider the following passages:
The will to power can manifest itself only against resistances; therefore it seeks that which resists it… (WP 656/KSA 12.9[151])
The will is never satisfied unless it has opponents and resistance. (WP 696/KSA 13:11[75])
When Nietzsche refers to "resistances," he means impediments or challenges to one's ends. The structure to which Nietzsche is drawing attention is clearest in the case of competitive or skillful endeavors, such as sports and games. Consider activities such as marathon running or chess playing.
Part of the point of these activities is that they are challenging, introducing obstacles or difficulties that must be overcome. One tries to run twenty-six miles, rather than twenty-six feet, because the former is so difficult and the latter so easy; analogously, one plays chess (and other games) precisely because one wants to encounter a challenging task, which requires skill and ingenuity to complete successfully. In short, agents who choose to engage in marathon running and chess playing seem actively to seek obstacles or resistances, in order to surmount them. In the passages quoted above, Nietzsche makes it clear that willing power involves doing just this.
Of course, one does not want these challenges or resistances to serve as permanent impediments to one's ends; rather, one wants to overcome the impediments. As Nietzsche puts it, the agent seeks to "again and again [become] master over that which stands in its way" (WP 696/KSA 13:11 [75] . For example, the marathoner does not want to confront the pain and difficulty of 21 Compare Alexander Nehamas's claim that "willing as an activity does not have an aim that is distinct from it; if it can be said to aim at anything at all, that can only be its own continuation.
Willing is an activity that tends to perpetuate itself, and this tendency to the perpetuation of activity… is what Nietzsche tries to describe by the obscure and often misleading term 'will to power '" (1985, 79) . Heidegger concurs: "will to power is will to will" (1979, vol. I, 37) .
running twenty-six miles, and find herself incapable of overcoming them, collapsing after five miles; rather, she wants to hold herself to the course of action despite the challenges involved in doing so.
She wants to overcome these obstacles, by completing the race. This is why the runner sets herself a goal that is achievable, albeit only with great difficulty. She does not set herself an impossible task such as running two hundred miles, nor does she set herself a less challenging task such as running five miles; she sets herself a challenging-yet-achievable task. (To return to the other example, chess players typically do the same thing: a typical chess player will seek to compete with players who are at similar or slightly superior levels of skill, rather than to play against opponents who are easily defeated or virtually undefeatable.)
In sum, Nietzsche seems to identify willing power with the activity of perpetually seeking and overcoming resistance to one's ends. I therefore conclude that, as Bernard Reginster puts it, "will to power, in the last analysis, is a will to the very activity of overcoming resistance" (Reginster 2006, 127) .
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It is important to notice that power is not a first-order end; rather, an agent wills power in the course of pursuing some other, more determinate end, such as completing a race or finishing a game. We might express this point by saying that will to power is a higher-order aim. In order to will power, one must aim at a determinate first-order goal, such as running or checkmating one's opponent. Will to power does not compete with these determinate goals; rather, it modifies the way in which these goals are pursued. As John Richardson helpfully puts it, will to power isn't a claim about what we will; it is a claim about how we will (Richardson 1996, 21) .
WILL TO POWER AS A CLAIM ABOUT THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF WILLING
Now we know what will to power is. But there is another central component to Nietzsche's account, which we will need to understand in order to uncover the connection between will to power and freedom. This is Nietzsche's claim that every action manifests will to power.
When we scrutinize our own actions, Nietzsche believes that we find that our most ubiquitous source of motivation, which lies behind all that we do, is will to power. Nietzsche often expresses this point by claiming that will to power is the "essence" [Wesen, Essenz] of willing. There are a number of passages in the published works and unpublished notebooks that make this point.
To choose just two:
All 'purposes,' 'aims,' 'meaning' are only modes of expression and metamorphoses of one will that is inherent in all events: the will to power. To have purposes, aims, intentions, willing in general, is the same thing as willing to be stronger, willing to grow-and, in addition, willing the means to this. (WP 675/KSA 13.11 [96] )
Everything that happens out of intentions can be reduced to the intention of increasing power.
In these quotations, Nietzsche claims that every episode of willing, or every action, aims at power.
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As noted in the last section, will to power is a higher-order aim: an agent pursues power in the course of pursuing some other, more determinate end. So Nietzsche's claim that every action aims at power amounts to this: whenever a person wills an end, this episode of willing has a certain structure. It consists not only in the aim of achieving some end, but also in the aim of encountering and overcoming resistance in the pursuit of that end.
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The notion that we strive to encounter and overcome resistance is most plausible in relation to competitive or skillful actions, but Nietzsche argues that this striving is a feature of all human actions. His argument for this claim is complex, and I lack the space to reconstruct it here. For present purposes, it will be sufficient to note that Nietzsche's argument takes the following form.
First, he argues that all human actions are motivated by a distinctive kind of psychological state, the drive (Trieb). Drives differ from desires in that while many desires are dispositions to realize some determinate end, drives are dispositions to engage in characteristic forms of activity. The aggressive drive, for example, does not motivate us to achieve any particular goal, but merely to engage in aggressive activity. For this reason, Nietzsche argues that any action that is motivated by a drive will have a higher-order aim of encountering and overcoming resistance: the drive motivates us to engage in characteristic patterns of activity, and manifesting these patterns of activity involves continual overcoming of the resistances to that activity. 25 If Nietzsche is correct that all human activities are drive-motivated (obviously, no small claim), then it follows that all human actions have a higher-order aim of encountering and overcoming resistance. In Nietzsche's terminology, this is equivalent to the claim that all human actions manifest will to power.
26
24 This is why Nietzsche says that "all 'purposes,' 'aims,' 'meaning' are only modes of expression and metamorphoses of one will that is inherent in all events: the will to power" (WP 675/KSA 13.11[96] ; emphasis added). He is not claiming that every goal is a means to power; rather, he is claiming that whenever we will any goal at all, we express will to power by also willing resistance to that goal. 25 More precisely, Nietzsche argues that what it is for something to aim at power is for it to be drivemotivated. Will to power is not an independent drive, but a description of the structure of drivemotivated actions. 26 Let me mention three important qualifications, which I discuss at length in Katsafanas (2013a) . First, Nietzsche argues that we can aim at X without realizing that we aim at X, indeed without the possibility of aiming at X ever entering our conscious reflection. So his claim that every action aims at power is not contradicted by the obvious fact that many individuals do not understand their actions as having this aim. Second, Nietzsche contends that many actions manifest the aim of Nietzsche's claim that every action aims at power is, of course, highly controversial.
However, our task here is not to assess this aspect of Nietzsche's account, but to determine the structure of Nietzsche's theory of normative authority. Thus, for present purposes, let's grant the claim and ask whether Nietzsche can use it to generate a compelling account of normative authority.
WHY DOES FREEDOM REQUIRE REVALUATION IN TERMS OF POWER?
Suppose Nietzsche can establish that every action aims at power. Given this premise,
Nietzsche is able to show that revaluation must be conducted in terms of will to power. His argument can be reconstructed as follows:
i. An agent is self-determining iff she acts on values whose authority has been critically assessed.
ii. In order to critically assess a value, one must determine whether the value minimizes conflicts with will to power. Those values that minimize these conflicts are acceptable, whereas those that do not are to be rejected.
iii. Therefore, if an agent is self-determining, then she acts on values that minimize conflict with will to power.
Premise (i) was defended in Section 3.1. Explicating and defending the crucial premise (ii) is the task of this section.
As I mentioned at the beginning of Section 4, Nietzsche's commitment to premise (ii) is clear; he repeatedly emphasizes that the "standard by which the value of moral evaluation is to be determined" is "will to power" (WP 391/KSA 12:2[131]; cf. A 2, A 6, WP 674/KSA 13:11[83]).
power only in a halfhearted, conflicted, or distorted fashion. Third, Nietzsche is not claiming that will to power is our strongest aim, nor is he claiming that it is typically decisive in determining what we will do. On the contrary, will to power has only a minor influence on most of our actions. It is not, so to speak, the strength of this motive that renders it important; it is the motive's omnipresence, which shapes our actions in a gradual and aggregative fashion.
Nietzsche suggests that any value that conflicts with will to power should be rejected. Second, it follows that if an aim is present in every episode of action, then whenever an agent acts she will have a (pro tanto) reason to fulfill this aim. So, given Nietzsche's claim that all actions aim at power, whenever a human being acts, she will have a reason to seek power.
Third, notice that these will-to-power-derived reasons will sometimes conflict with the reasons springing from our other aims and values. Nietzsche's point is simple: when there is a conflict between the will to power and some other value or aim, the only way in which we can alleviate the conflict is by modifying the other value or aim.
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I submit that Nietzsche takes these points to establish (ii). Given (ii), the conclusion follows:
if an agent is self-determining, then she acts on values that minimize conflict with will to power. 3. Rather, we use autonomy to assess our current values.
4. Yet autonomy somehow permits, and indeed requires, a radical critique of these current values.
The interpretation that I have proposed does, in fact, reconcile these claims.
First, notice that the demand for autonomy entails that we must revalue our values in light of will to power. So the demand for autonomy does generate a determinate constraint on permissible values: we are to adopt those values that minimize or eliminate conflict with will to power. Thus, condition (1) is fulfilled.
Second, on Nietzsche's view, we do not justify the authority of a value by showing that it derives from or is entailed by autonomy. Nietzsche does argue that one normative principle can be derived from the features of autonomous willing: the claim that we have reason to will power. But it should be clear that we are not going to be able to derive much additional content from this claim.
For example, there is no way of moving from the idea that we aim to encounter and overcome resistance to the idea that we should not lie, or that we should not murder. On the contrary, lying and murdering are ways-possibly quite good ways-of willing power. Fortunately, Nietzsche's will to power doctrine is not meant to function as a foundational principle from which we derive all other normative claims. Rather, as the prior sections explained, will to power is intended to serve as a "principle of revaluation." That is, the will to power generates a standard in terms of which we are to assess all other values. So Nietzsche grounds one normative principle in facts about our agential nature, and uses this principle not to derive, but to assess, the other values that we embrace. In this respect, Nietzsche's theory looks more Hegelian than Kantian: rather than attempting to derive our values from a formal principle, we use a formal principle to assess our current, historically contingent set of values. The resultant theory does not have a foundationalist structure, of the sort that Nietzsche clearly denounces; but it does give one value a privileged status, and it uses that value as a criterion or principle of revaluation. Thus, Conditions (2) and (3) are fulfilled.
Finally, the fact that power has a privileged status enables us to mount a radical critique of our current set of values and social institutions-a critique that may reveal them not merely to fall short of their own ideals, but to be deeply misguided in the goals they strive to realize. Power's privileged status gives us, as Nietzsche puts it, "a position outside morality," in terms of which we can reassess even our most basic values (GS 380). Thus, condition (4) is fulfilled.
So my proposed interpretation of Nietzsche's theory does, in fact, fulfill the four conditions.
Nietzsche's theory incorporates the most appealing features of the Kantian and Hegelian views: it is a non-foundationalist ethic, which nevertheless explains normative authority through an appeal to autonomy, and allows for a radical critique of our current values. And the importance of this result extends beyond questions of Nietzsche interpretation: if the argument is correct, then we can ground normativity in an ineluctable aim, assess other norms and values for consistency with this aim, and thereby generate a non-foundationalist, autonomy-based ethical theory.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that will to power is the red thread linking Nietzsche's claims about revaluation and freedom. Appreciating this point enables us to see how Nietzsche can reconcile seemingly incompatible elements of the Kantian and Hegelian accounts of normative authority.
Let me summarize the results. First, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche share a common foundational idea: they believe that the authority of normative claims can be justified only by
showing that these norms are, in some sense, self-imposed or autonomous. In other words, no realist construal of norms would be satisfactory; any legitimate norm must have its source in us.
However, this project gives rise to a problem: does the injunction "be autonomous!" impose any substantive constraints on the content of norms? If not, we face the charge that Hegel levies against Kant: the injunction has no content, so nothing could count as not fulfilling the demand.
Kant thinks he has a solution to this problem: he argues that autonomy yields commitment to the Viking, 1954) 
